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Abstract. From 18 to 23 November 2007, the Dagstuhl Seminar 07471
“Equilibrium Computation” was held in the International Conference
and Research Center (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl. During the seminar, sev-
eral participants presented their current research, and ongoing work and
open problems were discussed. Abstracts of the presentations given dur-
ing the seminar as well as abstracts of seminar results and ideas are put
together in this paper. The first section describes the seminar topics and
goals in general. Links to extended abstracts or full papers are provided,
if available.
Keywords. Equilibrium, algorithm, polynomial time, game theory, eco-
nomics
The purpose of this Dagstuhl seminar was to bring together researchers from
different disciplines working on algorithmic problems of finding equilibria. As
explained in the Motivation for this seminar, the different topics were (with
talks given by)
– Parity Games, Andersson (junior researcher), Gimbert (junior researcher),
Gra¨del (survey talk), Svensson (junior researcher), Zwick (survey talk),
– Complexity of Finding Equilibria, Elkind (junior researcher), Etessami (sur-
vey talk), Goldberg (introductory survey talk on the class PPAD, not listed
below), Fabrikant (junior researcher), Hoefer (junior researcher), Monien,
Vo¨cking (survey talk),
– Mathematical Programming, Halman, Morris, Theobald,
– Economic Equilibria, Heydenreich (junior researcher), Jain, Peeters (survey
talk),
– Game Theory, Balthasar (junior researcher), Goldberg, Jiang (junior re-
searcher), Sørensen (junior researcher), Turocy (survey talk), Vermeulen,
von Stengel.
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The abstracts of 25 talks are listed below. In addition to his talk, Paul Gold-
berg gave an introduction to the complexity class PPAD which is central for
defining the complexity of finding one equilibrium (for example, a Nash equi-
librium in a game of n players). This talk is accessible through the following
URL: http://www.csc.liv.ac.uk/∼pwg/PPADintro/PPADintro.html. This color-
ful talk was prepared by Paul Goldberg in Dagstuhl in immediate response to
requests for such an introduction, and is described as such on the mentioned
webpage.
Furthermore, Mike Paterson gave a popular evening talk on the entertaining
topic of piling bricks so that they can “stick out” as far as possible, which can be
considered as an “equilibrium problem” in physics but not in the computational
sense studied in the seminar.
Overall, the seminar talks represented a good balance of the topics, and
were not too numerous so as to make listening tiresome. A significant time was
spent in discussions, drawing on the expertise of experienced scholars in the
field (for example, Nimrod Megiddo). We encouraged, with success, to let junior
researchers present their work as much as possible. The survey talks, often given
by senior researchers, gave introductions and overviews.
Many of the topics of the seminar are in areas with very hard and long-
standing open questions. In particular, solving parity games, or the related mean-
payoff and simple stochastic games, in polynomial time is an intriguing open
problem. It is a plausible conjecture that this can be done, given that the problem
is in the intersection of the complexity classes NP and co-NP. The most famous
problem with that property is linear programming (LP), which is equivalent
to finding an equilibrium in a zero-sum game, and thus closely related to the
problems discussed in the workshop. The polynomial-time algorithms for linear
programming, such as the ellipsoid method, were hailed as breakthroughs at the
time. To this day, the understanding even of the linear programming problem is
limited; for example, we do not have a “combinatorial”, simplex-type algorithm
that would solve this problem in polynomial time.
In this context, the results by Nir Halman on an abstract view of LP-type
problems and their connection to the parity games and their relatives, provided
one example of a “bridge” across several fields, Mathematical Programming, Par-
ity Games, and the Complexity of Finding Equilibria. Some discussions started
in how this could be extended to the computation of Nash equilibria of bimatrix
games.
The equilibrium problems discussed in this workshop are much harder than
linear programming, which by itself is an important interesting case. None of the
main problems were solved – this would have been close to sensational –, but we
could observe some (necessarily partial and incremental) progress.
The hard problems mentioned above are concerned with computing Nash
equilibria. Another focus of the workshop was the computation of other, more
refined solution concepts. Here, the interaction between the participants from the
computer science community and the participants from the economics commu-
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nity was extremely fruitful. In particular, a number of computational problems
were jointly formulated which together form an interesting research program.
A representative example is the following: Given a three-player game in nor-
mal form and a strategy profile of the game, can it be decided in polynomial
time if the strategy profile is a (trembling hand) perfect equilibrium of the game?
The corresponding computational problem for Nash equilibria is trivial. One can
ask the same question for other refinement notions, and we believe it would be
very interesting to classify refinement notions by hardness or easiness of their
verification problem, for two reasons. First, an easiness result would be use-
ful in practice for studying equilibria computationally. Secondly, a refinement
notion where even the verification problem is computationally intractable may
arguably be considered an inferior solution concept to one where it is tractable
to determine if a given profile is in equilibrium.
The workshop demonstrated that the topic of “equilibrium computation” is
of great current interest. The stimulating discussions showed that it was very
well worth bringing researchers together who normally operate in different com-
munities.
Improved Algorithms for Discounted Payoff Games
Daniel Andersson (Aarhus University, DK)
We present the first strongly polynomial algorithms for solving single-player Dis-
counted Payoff Games. We show that an optimal counter strategy against a fixed
positional strategy in a generalized two-player discounted payoff game, where
edges have individual discounts, can be computed in O(mn2 logm) strongly poly-
nomial time, where n and m are the number of vertices and edges in the game
graph. This results in the best known strongly subexponential time bound for
solving two-player zero-sum generalized discounted payoff games.
Equilibrium Tracing in Bimatrix Games
Anne Balthasar (London School of Economics, GB)
We analyze the relations of the van den Elzen-Talman algorithm, the Lemke-
Howson algorithm and the global Newton method introduced by Govindan and
Wilson. It is known that the global Newton method encompasses the Lemke-
Howson algorithm; we prove that it also comprises the van den Elzen-Talman
algorithm, and more generally, the linear tracing procedure, as a special case.
This will lead us to a discussion of traceability of equilibria of index +1. We
answer negatively the open question of whether, generically, the van den Elzen-
Talman algorithm is flexible enough to trace all equilibria of index +1.
Keywords: Bimatrix games, Equilibrium computation, Homotopy methods,
Index
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2008/1526
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Nash Equilibria in Graphical Games on Trees
Edith Elkind (Univ. of Southampton, GB)
Graphical games are a natural and compact representation formalism for a large
class of multi-player games. They have been introduced by Kearns, Littman and
Singh in UAI’01, and have recently been used in the proof of the seminal PPAD-
hardness result for finding a Nash equilibrium in 2-player, n-action games. This
proof shows that finding a Nash equilibrium in general bounded-degree graphical
games in PPAD-hard as well. In this talk, we discuss polynomial-time algorithms
for finding Nash equilibria in graphical games on bounded-degree trees. We show
that an algorithm for this problem that was proposed by Littman, Kearns and
Singh in NIPS’01 is incorrect and describe how to fix it. Our version of the
algorithm runs in polynomial time if the underlying graph is a path, but may
require exponential time even on very simple trees. We show that this is, in
some sense, inevitable: any algorithm that is based on the general approach of
Littman et al. will have to store an exponentially large data structure. Moreover,
the problem remains PPAD-complete for graphs with bounded pathwidth.
We also discuss the problem of finding Nash equilibria with special properties,
such as the ones that maximize the total payoff or guarantee certain payoffs to
all players.
Joint work of: Elkind, Edith; Goldberg, Leslie Ann; Goldberg, Paul
On the Complexity of Nash Equilibria and Other Fixed
Points
Kousha Etessami (Univ. of Edinburgh, GB)
We reexamine what it means to compute Nash equilibria and, more generally,
what it means to compute a fixed point of a given Brouwer function, and we
investigate the complexity of the associated problems. Specifically, we study the
complexity of the following problem: given a finite game, Γ , with 3 or more
players, and given  > 0, compute a vector x′ (a mixed strategy profile) that is
within distance  (say, in l∞) of some (exact) Nash equilibrium.
We show that approximation of an (actual) Nash equilibrium for games with
3 players, even to within any non-trivial constant additive factor  < 1/2 in just
one desired coordinate, is at least as hard as the long standing square-root sum
problem, as well as more general arithmetic circuit decision problems, and thus
that even placing the approximation problem in NP would resolve a major open
problem in the complexity of numerical computation. Furthermore, we show that
the (exact or approximate) computation of Nash equilibria for 3 or more players
is complete for the class of search problems, which we call FIXP, that can be
cast as fixed point computation problems for functions represented by algebraic
circuits (straight line programs) over basis {+, ∗,−, /,max,min}, with rational
constants. We show that the linear fragment of FIXP equals PPAD.
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Many problems in game theory, economics, and probability theory, can be
cast as fixed point problems for such algebraic functions. We discuss several
important such problems: computing the value of Shapley’s stochastic games,
and the simpler games of Condon, extinction probabilities of branching processes,
termination probabilities of stochastic context-free grammars, and of Recursive
Markov Chains. We show that for some of them, the approximation, or even
exact computation, problem can be placed in PPAD, while for others, they are
at least as hard as the square-root sum and arithmetic circuit decision problems.
(Joint work with Mihalis Yannakakis, Columbia U.)
The Complexity of Game Dynamics: Sink Equilibria, BGP
Oscillations, and Beyond
Alex Fabrikant (Univ. of California – Berkeley, US)
We show that the concept of sink equilibria proposed recently by Goemans, Mir-
rokni, and Vetta is PSPACE-complete to analyze and approximate for graphical
games. We also settle the complexity of a well-known problem in networking by
establishing that it is PSPACE-complete to tell whether a system of path pref-
erences in the BGP protocol can lead to oscillatory behavior; one key insight is
that the BGP oscillation question is in fact one about Nash dynamics. Finally,
we propose a new equilibrium concept inspired by game dynamics, unit recall
equilibria, which we show to be close to universal (exists with high probability
in a random game) and algorithmically promising. We also give a relaxation
thereof, called component-wise unit recall equilibria, which we show to be both
tractable and universal (guaranteed to exist in every game).
Keywords: Algorithmic game theory, sink equilibria, nash dynamics, best-
response dynamics, unit recall, bounded recall, BGP, SPP, convergence, com-
plexity
Joint work of: Fabrikant, Alex; Papadimitriou, Christos H.
Full Paper:
http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1347082.1347175
See also: Fabrikant, A. and Papadimitriou, C. H. The complexity of game
dynamics: BGP oscillations, sink equilibria, and beyond. In Proc. of the 19th
Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA), San Francisco,
CA, January 2008. SIAM, Philadelphia, PA, pages 844–853.
Fast-Converging Tatonnement Algorithms for the Market
Problem
Lisa Fleischer (Dartmouth College – Hanover, US)
Why might markets tend toward and remain near equilibrium prices?
6 Herings, Jurdzinski, Miltersen, Tardos and von Stengel
In an effort to shed light on this question from an algorithmic perspective,
this paper formalizes the setting of Ongoing Markets, by contrast with the classic
market scenario, which we term One-Time Markets. The Ongoing Market allows
trade at non-equilibrium prices, and, as its name suggests, continues over time.
As such, it appears to be a more plausible model of actual markets.
For both market settings, this paper defines and analyzes variants of a simple
tatonnement algorithm that differs from previous algorithms that have been
subject to asymptotic analysis in three significant respects: the price update for
a good depends only on the price, demand, and supply for that good, and on
no other information; the price update for each good occurs distributively and
asynchronously; the algorithms work (and the analyses hold) from an arbitrary
starting point.
Our algorithm introduces a new and natural update rule. We show that this
update rule leads to fast convergence toward equilibrium prices in a broad class
of markets that satisfy the weak gross substitutes property. These are the first
analyses for computationally and informationally distributed algorithms that
demonstrate polynomial convergence.
Our analysis identifies three parameters characterizing the markets, which
govern the rate of convergence of our protocols. These parameters are, broadly
speaking:
1. A bound on the fractional rate of change of demand for each good with
respect to fractional changes in its price.
2. A bound on the fractional rate of change of demand for each good with
respect to fractional changes in wealth.
3. The closeness of the market to a Fisher market (a market with buyers starting
with money alone).
We give two types of protocols. The first type assumes global knowledge of only
(an upper bound on) the first parameter. For this protocol, we also provide a
matching lower bound in terms of these parameters for the One-Time Market.
Our second protocol, which is analyzed for the One-Time Market only, assumes
no global knowledge whatsoever.
Keywords: Tatonnement, market equilibria
Joint work of: Cole, Richard; Fleischer, Lisa
Full Paper:
http://www.cs.dartmouth.edu/∼lkf/papers/fp299-rev1.pdf
See also: Fleischer, L. and Cole, R., Fast-Converging Tatonnement Algorithms
for One-Time and Ongoing Market Problems. In: Proc. STOC 2008.
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Solving Simple Stochastic Games with Few Random
Vertices
Hugo Gimbert (LaBRI – Bordeaux, FR)
A Simple Stochastic Game is played by two players called Min and Max, moving
turn by turn a pebble along edges of a graph. Player Max wants the pebble to
reach a special vertex called the target vertex. On some special vertices called
random vertices, the next vertex is chosen randomly according to some fixed
transition probabilities. Solving a simple stochastic game consists in comput-
ing the maximal probability with which player Max can enforce the pebble to
reach the target vertex. In this talk, we will present a new algorithm for solving
stochastic games, especially efficient for games with few random vertices.
Keywords: Simple stochastic games
Joint work of: Gimbert, Hugo; Horn, Florian
The Price of Selfish Stackelberg Leadership in Network
Games
Paul Goldberg (University of Liverpool, GB)
We study a well-known model of competitive routing through a network of “par-
allel links”. In this setting there is typically a “price of anarchy” arising from
the assumption that users behave selfishly and do not comply with any central
control. We investigate the additional cost that arises when some user gets to
choose his strategy and commit to it, ahead of the other users (this is what is
meant by Stackelberg leadership).
All users are selfish, including the leader. We identify some upper and lower
bound on the additional social cost that arises in this situation.
Keywords: Multicommodity routing, network, atomic splittable flow
Joint work of: Goldberg, Paul; Polpinit, Pattarawit
Infinite Games
Erich Gra¨del (RWTH Aachen, DE)
Graph games, in which two or more players take turns (or not) to move a token
through a directed graph, tracing out a possibly infinite path, have numerous
applications, for instance for the design and verification of reactive systems, for
the efficient evaluation of logical formulae, for planning and so on.
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The fundamental mathematical questions on such games concern the exis-
tence of optimal strategies for the players, the complexity and structural proper-
ties of such strategies, and their realization by efficient algorithms. Which games
are determined, in the sense that from each position, one of the players has a
winning strategy? How to compute winning positions and optimal strategies?
How much knowledge on the past of a play is necessary to determine an optimal
next action? Which games are determined by memoryless strategies? And so on.
These questions are not only mathematically interesting, but translate into
questions of design and verification of computing systems. The answers strongly
depend on the particular form of a graph game, such as the number of players,
the form of interaction between players (turn based or concurrent), the informa-
tion that is available to the players, the structure of the game graph, and the
type of the objectives or winning conditions of the players. A well-understood
case are two-player, zero-sum games with perfect information and omega-regular
objectives.
This talk will be a survey on fundamental concepts and results in the algo-
rithmic theory of infinite games, focussing on
– Positional determinacy: what kind of winning conditions guarantee that all
games with that condition are determined via positional winning strategies.
– Solution concepts and algorithms for infinite multiplayer games:
Conditions that guarantee the existence of Nash equilibria and subgame per-
fect equilibria, algorithmic realisation of such solution concepts.
Simple Stochastic Games, Parity Games, Mean Payoff
Games and Discounted Payoff Games are all LP-Type
Problems
Nir Halman (MIT – Cambridge, US)
We show that a Simple Stochastic Game (SSG) can be formulated as an LP-
type problem. Using this formulation, and the known algorithm of Sharir and
Welzl for LP-type problems, we obtain the first strongly subexponential solution
for SSGs (a strongly subexponential algorithm has only been known for binary
SSGs).
Using known reductions between various games, we achieve the first trongly
subexponential solutions for Discounted and Mean Payoff Games. We also give
alternative simple proofs for the best known upper bounds for Parity Games and
binary SSGs.
To the best of our knowledge, the LP-type framework has been used so far
only in order to yield linear or close to linear time algorithms for various problems
in computational geometry and location theory. Our approach demonstrates
the applicability of the LP-type framework in other fields, and for achieving
subexponential algorithms.
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Keywords: Subexponential algorithm, LP-type framework
Extended Abstract: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2008/1527
Full Paper:
http://www.springerlink.com/content/j771w6ku0141n5pr/?p=6d6dc8caf83e4c3fabe6a6320fdd4b0e&pi=0
See also: Algorithmica, volume 49 (September 2007), pages 37–50.
Graph Theoretic Characterization of Revenue Equivalence
Birgit Heydenreich (Maastricht University, NL)
The property of an allocation rule to be implementable in dominant strategies by
a unique payment scheme is called revenue equivalence. In this paper we give a
characterization of revenue equivalence based on a graph theoretic interpretation
of the incentive compatibility constraints. The characterization holds for any
(possibly infinite) outcome space and many of the known results are immediate
consequences. Moreover, revenue equivalence can be identified in cases, where
the existing literature will be silent.
Joint work of: Heydenreich, Birgit; Mu¨ller, Rudolf; Uetz, Marc; Vohra, Rakesh
Stackelberg Network Pricing Games
Martin Hoefer (RWTH Aachen, DE)
We study a multi-player one-round game in which a leader can set prices for a
subset of m pricable edges in a graph. The other edges have a fixed cost.
Based on the leader’s decision one or more followers optimize a polynomial-
time solvable combinatorial minimization problem and choose a minimum cost
solution satisfying their requirements. The leader receives as revenue the total
amount of prices paid by the followers for pricable edges in their solutions. Our
first result is a tight analysis of a single-price algorithm for revenue maximization
with a single follower, which provides a (1 + ) logm approximation for any
constant  > 0. This can be extended to a (1+)(log k+logm)-approximation for
k followers. For the latter we show almost matching hardness results. Our second
result is that in case of a single follower in Stackelberg bipartite vertex cover,
there is an efficient algorithm to compute optimum pricies using LP-duality
techniques. It can be extended to provide constant-factor approximations for
any constant number of followers.
Joint work of: Hoefer, Martin; Briest, Patrick; Krysta, Piotr
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Equilibria in the Presence of a Broker
Kamal Jain (Microsoft Corp. – Redmond, US)
Several equilibria situations have broker in between. For an example, search ad
and product shelves at retailers. At a fundamental level, if we ignore the fine
tuned pricing mechanism, we observe that these two brokering situation are
similar. Of course, economic theory suggests that pricing mechanism is only a
way to reach equilibria. In our model we notice that search ads and product
shelves at retailers reach totally different market equilibria.
Keywords: Paid search, sponsored search, search, equilibrium, equilibria, retail
Full Paper:
http://search.live.com/results.aspx?mkt=en-us&q=kamal+jain&FORM=TOOLBR
See also:
http://www.eng.auburn.edu/∼jvalenz/Colloquia2007/Kamal.htm
Action-Graph Games
Albert Xin Jiang (University of British Columbia – Vancouver, CA)
Action-Graph Games (AGGs) are a fully expressive game representation which
can compactly express strict and context-specific independence and anonymity
structure in players’ utility functions. We present an efficient algorithm for com-
puting expected payoffs under mixed strategy profiles. This algorithm runs in
time polynomial in the size of the AGG representation (which is itself polynomial
in the number of players when the in-degree of the action graph is bounded).
Keywords: Computational game theory, graphical models, compact represen-
tations of games
Joint work of: Jiang, Albert Xin; Leyton-Brown, Kevin
Multiprocessor Scheduling is PLS complete
Burkhard Monien (Universita¨t Paderborn, DE)
We show that the problem of scheduling weighted jobs on identical machines is
PLS complete for a sufficiently large neighbourhood. We show this result for two
models of local improvement.
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In the first model, in an improvement step either the makespan decreases
or the makespan remains unchanged and the number of makespan machines
decreases. In the second model, we consider the selfish version of the problem
where the jobs are viewed as selfish agents. The cost of an agent is the load of the
machine to which it is assigned. The cost of a coalition of agents is defined to be
the maximal evaluation of its members. In an improvement step, the cost of the
coalition of reallocating agents decreases. Both these problems are PLS-complete
when 36 jobs/agents are allowed to be reallocated.
We show these results by reduction from some Multi Constraint Assignment
problem (p, q, r)-MCA which is an extension of the generalized MAXSAT prob-
lem to higher valued variables. Here, p is the maximal length of a constraint,
q is the maximal number of appearances of a variable and r is the valuedness
of the variables. We show that (3, 2, r)-MCA and (2, 3, r)-MCAbipartite are PLS
complete for sufficiently large r.
We also show that the restricted scheduling problem, where for each job/agent
there exists a set of forbidden machines, is PLS complete already for a 13-
neighbourhood.
Good Hidden P-matrix Sandwiches
Walter Morris (George Mason Univ. – Fairfax, US)
A square matrix is a P-matrix if all of its principal minors are positive.
The complexity of solving the linear complementarity problem with data
(M, q) where M is a P-matrix is unknown. Recently, Ga¨rtner and Ru¨st, and also
Svensson and Vorobyov, showed that the problem of solving a simple stochastic
game can be reduced to solving a generalized LCP with a block P-matrix. A
subclass of the class of P-matrices is that of hidden Minkowski matrices. (Gen-
eralized) LCPs with matrices in this class are known to be solvable in polynomial
time. We briefly describe geometrically why this is so. We study some general-
izations of the class of hidden Minkowski matrices. Some of these generalizations
contain the class of P-matrices, and some are contained in the class of P-matrices.
Thus the class of P-matrices is “sandwiched” between these generalized classes,
many of which can be recognized in polynomial time.
Joint work of: Morris, Walter; Namiki, Makoto
See also: Linear Algebra and its Applications 426 (2007) 325–341.
Homotopy Methods to Compute Equilibria in Game
Theory
Ronald Peeters (Maastricht University, NL)
This paper presents a survey of the use of homotopy methods in game theory.
Homotopies allow for a robust computation of game-theoretic equilibria and their
refinements.
12 Herings, Jurdzinski, Miltersen, Tardos and von Stengel
Homotopies are also suitable to compute equilibria that are selected by vari-
ous selection theories. We present the relevant techniques underlying homotopy
algorithms. We give detailed expositions of the Lemke-Howson algorithm and
the van den Elzen-Talman algorithm to compute Nash equilibria in 2-person
games, and the Herings-van den Elzen, Herings-Peeters, and McKelvey-Palfrey
algorithms to compute Nash equilibria in general n-person games. We explain
how the main ideas can be extended to compute equilibria in extensive form and
dynamic games, and how homotopies can be used to compute all Nash equilibria.
Keywords: Homotopy, Equilibrium computation, Non-cooperative games, Nash
Equilibrium
Joint work of: Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; Peeters, Ronald
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2008/1525
Fast Algorithms for Finding Proper Strategies in Game
Trees
Troels Bjerre Sørensen (Univ. of Aarhus, DK)
We show how to find a normal form proper equilibrium in behavior strategies of
a given two-player zero-sum extensive form game with imperfect information but
perfect recall. Our algorithm solves a finite sequence of linear programs and runs
in polynomial time. For the case of a perfect information game, we show how
to find a normal form proper equilibrium in linear time by a simple backwards
induction procedure.
Keywords: Equilibrium refinements
Joint work of: Miltersen, Peter Bro; Sørensen, Troels Bjerre
Full Paper:
http://www.daimi.au.dk/∼bromille/Papers/extproper2.pdf
Simple Stochastic Games and Linear Complementarity
Ola Svensson (IDSIA – Lugano, CH)
We show how to represent Simple Stochastic Games (SSG) as the (Generalized)
Linear Complementarity Problem (GLCP). More specifically, we show that SSGs
reduce to a nontrivial subclass of P-matrix GLCPs, which we call D-matrix
GLCPs. This relates two problems with similar complexity status: NP-hardness
for any of the two problems would imply NP=coNP but at the same time they
are not known to be in P. P-matrix LCPs and GLCPs are not even known to be
solvable in subexponential time.
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Restricting ourself to D-matrix GLCPs allows us to present a randomized
algorithm with subexponential analysis, matching the best known algorithms
for SSGs.
Keywords: Simple Stochastic Games, Linear Complementarity, P-matrices
Enumerating the Nash Equilibria of Rank-1 Games
Thorsten Theobald (Universita¨t Frankfurt, DE)
A bimatrix game (A,B) is called a game of rank k if the rank of the matrix
A+B is at most k. We consider the problem of enumerating the Nash equilibria
in (non-degenerate) games of rank 1.
In particular, we show that even for games of rank 1 not all equilibria can
be reached by a Lemke-Howson path and present a parametric simplex-type
algorithm for enumerating all Nash equilibria of a non-degenerate game of rank 1.
Keywords: Bimatrix game, Nash equilibrium, enumeration, games of fixed rank
Full Paper:
http://arxiv.org/abs/0709.1263
The Gambit Project: Current State and Future Directions
Ted Turocy (Texas A&M University, US)
The Gambit project is an Open Source software project providing tools for an-
alyzing finite N -player games. This talk outlines the objectives of the project,
enumerates the tools currently provided, and proposes some directions for future
development and collaboration.
Keywords: Game theory, Nash equilibrium
Where Strategic and Evolutionary Stability Depart – A
Study of Minimal Diversity Games
Dries Vermeulen (Maastricht University, NL)
A minimum diversity game is a strategic form game in which the players have
the same pure strategy set. When playing a pure strategy profile, each player
always receives 1, unless all players use the same pure strategy, in which case
they all receive 0 payoff.
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Such a game has an isolated completely mixed Nash equilibrium. The other
equilibria form the component of Pareto optimal strategy profiles where all play-
ers receive 1.
The completely mixed Nash equilibrium is essential and strategically stable
in the sense of Mertens. It is however a repellent rest point of the replicator
dynamics. On the other hand, the set of Pareto optimal Nash equilibria is a
topological spere that is asymptotically stable under the replicator dynamics.
When the dimension of the sphere is even, this component of Nash equilibria
contains a stable set in the sense of Mertens. However, for two player games
where the dimension of the sphere is odd, that is when both players have an odd
number of pure strategies, the sphere is no longer stable in the sense of Mertens.
The same result is obtained for the three player minimum diversity game where
each player has two pure strategies.
Keywords: Strategic stability, evolutionary stability
Joint work of: Vermeulen, Dries; Balkenborg, Dieter
Complexity of Congestion Games
Berthold Vo¨cking (RWTH Aachen, DE)
In a congestion game, several players simultaneously aim at allocating sets
of resources, e.g., each player aims at allocating a shortest path between a
source/destination pair in a given network or, to give another example, each
player aims at allocating a minimum weight spanning tree in a given graph.
The cost (length, delay, weight) of a resource (edge) is a function of the conges-
tion, i.e., the number of players allocating the resource. In our talk, we survey
recent results about the complexity of computing Nash equilibria and approx-
imate equilibria for congestion games and the convergence time towards Nash
equilibria.
Keywords: Congestion games, Nash equilibria, complexity, approximability
Algorithms for Finding Equilibria in Games: Things to Do
Bernhard von Stengel (London School of Economics, GB)
This is a short presentation arguing that we have to put existing algorithms
for finding equilibria in games to use. This requires to implement them, and,
most importantly, to give them interfaces. These should be back-end interfaces,
using specific file formats for games, strategies, algorithmic problems, equilibria,
etc., that allows these algorithms to be used by other programs. For the user,
we need front-end interfaces to input and display games, and to generate large
games from rules. Finally, we should care more to find, and listen to, users of
our algorithms.
Keywords: Equilibrium computation, programming
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Simple stochastic games, mean payoff games and parity
games – a survey
Uri Zwick (Tel Aviv University, IL)
In this survey talk I will define the three classes of games mentioned in the title
and summarize what is known about them.
It is a major open problem whether these games can be solved in polynomial
time. The “highlights” of the talk include a randomized subexponential time
algorithm for Simple Stochastic Games obtained in 1995 by Ludwig, and a de-
terministic subexponential time algorithm for Parity Games obtained in 2006 by
Jurdzinski, Paterson and Zwick.
Keywords: Simple stochastic games, mean payoff games, parity games
Full Paper:
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1109557.1109571
See also: Proc. of SODA’06, pages 117–123.
